FreshPorts - VuXML

This page displays vulnerability information about FreeBSD Ports.

The VUXML data was last processed by FreshPorts on 2024-04-19 20:48:44 UTC

List all Vulnerabilities, by package

List all Vulnerabilities, by date

k68

These are the vulnerabilities relating to the commit you have selected:

VuXML ID	Description
1cf65085-a760-41d2-9251-943e1af62eb8	X.org libraries -- multiple vulnerabilities Matthieu Herrb reports: Tobias Stoeckmann from the OpenBSD project has discovered a number of issues in the way various X client libraries handle the responses they receive from servers, and has worked with X.Org's security team to analyze, confirm, and fix these issues. These issue come in addition to the ones discovered by Ilja van Sprundel in 2013. Most of these issues stem from the client libraries trusting the server to send correct protocol data, and not verifying that the values will not overflow or cause other damage. Most of the time X clients and servers are run by the same user, with the server more privileged than the clients, so this is not a problem, but there are scenarios in which a privileged client can be connected to an unprivileged server, for instance, connecting a setuid X client (such as a screen lock program) to a virtual X server (such as Xvfb or Xephyr) which the user has modified to return invalid data, potentially allowing the user to escalate their privileges. Discovery 2016-10-04 Entry 2016-10-07 Modified 2016-10-10 libX11 < 1.6.4,1 libXfixes < 5.0.3 libXi < 1.7.7,1 libXrandr < 1.5.1 libXrender < 0.9.10 libXtst < 1.2.3 libXv < 1.0.11,1 libXvMC < 1.0.10 https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2016-October/002720.html CVE-2016-5407

VuXML ID

Description

1cf65085-a760-41d2-9251-943e1af62eb8

X.org libraries -- multiple vulnerabilities

Matthieu Herrb reports:

Tobias Stoeckmann from the OpenBSD project has discovered a number of issues in the way various X client libraries handle the responses they receive from servers, and has worked with X.Org's security team to analyze, confirm, and fix these issues. These issue come in addition to the ones discovered by Ilja van Sprundel in 2013.

Most of these issues stem from the client libraries trusting the server to send correct protocol data, and not verifying that the values will not overflow or cause other damage. Most of the time X clients and servers are run by the same user, with the server more privileged than the clients, so this is not a problem, but there are scenarios in which a privileged client can be connected to an unprivileged server, for instance, connecting a setuid X client (such as a screen lock program) to a virtual X server (such as Xvfb or Xephyr) which the user has modified to return invalid data, potentially allowing the user to escalate their privileges.

Discovery 2016-10-04
Entry 2016-10-07
Modified 2016-10-10
libX11

< 1.6.4,1

libXfixes

< 5.0.3

libXi

< 1.7.7,1

libXrandr

< 1.5.1

libXrender

< 0.9.10

libXtst

< 1.2.3

libXv

< 1.0.11,1

libXvMC

< 1.0.10

https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2016-October/002720.html
CVE-2016-5407