FreshPorts - VuXML

Multiple vulnerabilities exist in puppet that can result in arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file read access, denial of service, and arbitrary file write access. Please review the details in each of the CVEs for additional information.

lt 2.7.12_1

puppet -- multiple vulnerabilities

Arbitrary file read on the puppet master from authenticated clients (high). It is possible to construct an HTTP get request from an authenticated client with a valid certificate that will return the contents of an arbitrary file on the Puppet master that the master has read-access to.

Arbitrary file delete/D.O.S on Puppet Master from authenticated clients (high). Given a Puppet master with the "Delete" directive allowed in auth.conf for an authenticated host, an attacker on that host can send a specially crafted Delete request that can cause an arbitrary file deletion on the Puppet master, potentially causing a denial of service attack. Note that this vulnerability does *not* exist in Puppet as configured by default.

The last_run_report.yaml is world readable (medium). The most recent Puppet run report is stored on the Puppet master with world-readable permissions. The report file contains the context diffs of any changes to configuration on an agent, which may contain sensitive information that an attacker can then access. The last run report is overwritten with every Puppet run.

Arbitrary file read on the Puppet master by an agent (medium). This vulnerability is dependent upon vulnerability "last_run_report.yml is world readable" above. By creating a hard link of a Puppet-managed file to an arbitrary file that the Puppet master can read, an attacker forces the contents to be written to the puppet run summary. The context diff is stored in last_run_report.yaml, which can then be accessed by the attacker.

Insufficient input validation for agent hostnames (low). An attacker could trick the administrator into signing an attacker's certificate rather than the intended one by constructing specially crafted certificate requests containing specific ANSI control sequences. It is possible to use the sequences to rewrite the order of text displayed to an administrator such that display of an invalid certificate and valid certificate are transposed. If the administrator signs the attacker's certificate, the attacker can then man-in-the-middle the agent.

Agents with certnames of IP addresses can be impersonated (low). If an authenticated host with a certname of an IP address changes IP addresses, and a second host assumes the first host's former IP address, the second host will be treated by the puppet master as the first one, giving the second host access to the first host's catalog. Note: This will not be fixed in Puppet versions prior to the forthcoming 3.x. Instead, with this announcement IP-based authentication in Puppet < 3.x is deprecated.

gt 2.7.* lt 2.7.18

Multiple vulnerabilities exist in puppet that can result in arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file read access, denial of service, and arbitrary file write access. Please review the details in each of the CVEs for additional information.

lt 2.7.12_1

puppet -- multiple vulnerabilities

Arbitrary file read on the puppet master from authenticated clients (high). It is possible to construct an HTTP get request from an authenticated client with a valid certificate that will return the contents of an arbitrary file on the Puppet master that the master has read-access to.

Arbitrary file delete/D.O.S on Puppet Master from authenticated clients (high). Given a Puppet master with the "Delete" directive allowed in auth.conf for an authenticated host, an attacker on that host can send a specially crafted Delete request that can cause an arbitrary file deletion on the Puppet master, potentially causing a denial of service attack. Note that this vulnerability does *not* exist in Puppet as configured by default.

The last_run_report.yaml is world readable (medium). The most recent Puppet run report is stored on the Puppet master with world-readable permissions. The report file contains the context diffs of any changes to configuration on an agent, which may contain sensitive information that an attacker can then access. The last run report is overwritten with every Puppet run.

Arbitrary file read on the Puppet master by an agent (medium). This vulnerability is dependent upon vulnerability "last_run_report.yml is world readable" above. By creating a hard link of a Puppet-managed file to an arbitrary file that the Puppet master can read, an attacker forces the contents to be written to the puppet run summary. The context diff is stored in last_run_report.yaml, which can then be accessed by the attacker.

Insufficient input validation for agent hostnames (low). An attacker could trick the administrator into signing an attacker's certificate rather than the intended one by constructing specially crafted certificate requests containing specific ANSI control sequences. It is possible to use the sequences to rewrite the order of text displayed to an administrator such that display of an invalid certificate and valid certificate are transposed. If the administrator signs the attacker's certificate, the attacker can then man-in-the-middle the agent.

Agents with certnames of IP addresses can be impersonated (low). If an authenticated host with a certname of an IP address changes IP addresses, and a second host assumes the first host's former IP address, the second host will be treated by the puppet master as the first one, giving the second host access to the first host's catalog. Note: This will not be fixed in Puppet versions prior to the forthcoming 3.x. Instead, with this announcement IP-based authentication in Puppet < 3.x is deprecated.

gt 2.7.* lt 2.7.18

Multiple vulnerabilities exist in puppet that can result in arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file read access, denial of service, and arbitrary file write access. Please review the details in each of the CVEs for additional information.

lt 2.7.12_1

puppet -- multiple vulnerabilities

Arbitrary file read on the puppet master from authenticated clients (high). It is possible to construct an HTTP get request from an authenticated client with a valid certificate that will return the contents of an arbitrary file on the Puppet master that the master has read-access to.

Arbitrary file delete/D.O.S on Puppet Master from authenticated clients (high). Given a Puppet master with the "Delete" directive allowed in auth.conf for an authenticated host, an attacker on that host can send a specially crafted Delete request that can cause an arbitrary file deletion on the Puppet master, potentially causing a denial of service attack. Note that this vulnerability does *not* exist in Puppet as configured by default.

The last_run_report.yaml is world readable (medium). The most recent Puppet run report is stored on the Puppet master with world-readable permissions. The report file contains the context diffs of any changes to configuration on an agent, which may contain sensitive information that an attacker can then access. The last run report is overwritten with every Puppet run.

Arbitrary file read on the Puppet master by an agent (medium). This vulnerability is dependent upon vulnerability "last_run_report.yml is world readable" above. By creating a hard link of a Puppet-managed file to an arbitrary file that the Puppet master can read, an attacker forces the contents to be written to the puppet run summary. The context diff is stored in last_run_report.yaml, which can then be accessed by the attacker.

Insufficient input validation for agent hostnames (low). An attacker could trick the administrator into signing an attacker's certificate rather than the intended one by constructing specially crafted certificate requests containing specific ANSI control sequences. It is possible to use the sequences to rewrite the order of text displayed to an administrator such that display of an invalid certificate and valid certificate are transposed. If the administrator signs the attacker's certificate, the attacker can then man-in-the-middle the agent.

Agents with certnames of IP addresses can be impersonated (low). If an authenticated host with a certname of an IP address changes IP addresses, and a second host assumes the first host's former IP address, the second host will be treated by the puppet master as the first one, giving the second host access to the first host's catalog. Note: This will not be fixed in Puppet versions prior to the forthcoming 3.x. Instead, with this announcement IP-based authentication in Puppet < 3.x is deprecated.

gt 2.7.* lt 2.7.18