This release contains 2 security fixes:

CVE-2022-39253

When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious repository. Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local` clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory. Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be "user" by default.

CVE-2022-39260

An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists. `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject inputs larger than 2GiB.

< 2.38.1

< 2.38.1

< 2.38.1

git developers reports:

This update includes 2 security fixes:

• CVE-2023-25652: By feeding specially crafted input to `git apply --reject`, a path outside the working tree can be overwritten with partially controlled contents (corresponding to the rejected hunk(s) from the given patch)
• CVE-2023-29007: A specially crafted `.gitmodules` file with submodule URLs that are longer than 1024 characters can used to exploit a bug that can be used to inject arbitrary configuration into user's git config. This can result in arbitrary execution of code, by inserting values for core.pager, core.editor and so on

< 2.40.1

< 2.40.1

< 2.40.1